

Validity, satisfiability (1)

Lecture notes 4.0

Propositional calculus: satisfiability, validity, logical consequence

COMP 2411, session 1, 2004

Lecture notes 4.0, COMP 2411, session 1, 2004 – p. 1

Validity, satisfiability (2)

A valid formula is also called a **tautology**.

From these definitions we obtain:

- A valid formula is satisfiable.
 - A formula φ is valid iff $\neg\varphi$ is not satisfiable.
 - A formula φ is satisfiable iff $\neg\varphi$ is not valid.
1. In the first case above, φ is valid (e.g., $\varphi = p \vee \neg p$ is valid)—hence also satisfiable.
 2. In the second case above, φ is not satisfiable (e.g., $\varphi = p \wedge \neg p$ is not satisfiable)—hence also not valid.
 3. In the third case above, both φ and $\neg\varphi$ are satisfiable (e.g., $\varphi = p$ and $\neg\varphi = \neg p$ are both satisfiable)—hence also neither φ nor $\neg\varphi$ is valid.

Lecture notes 4.0, COMP 2411, session 1, 2004 – p. 3

When we build a truth table for a propositional formula φ , we obtain one and only one of the following 3 cases:

1. the last column is filled with **true** only (e.g., $\varphi = p \vee \neg p$),
or
2. the last column is filled with **false** only (e.g., $\varphi = p \wedge \neg p$),
or
3. the last column is filled with both **true** and **false** (e.g., $\varphi = p$).

The notions of satisfiability and validity enable to describe these cases.

- **Definition:** A formula is **satisfiable** if it is true in some interpretation.
- **Definition:** A formula is **valid** if it is true in all interpretations.


Lecture notes 4.0, COMP 2411, session 1, 2004 – p. 2

Validity, satisfiability (3)

Validity captures the notion of being **logically true**—true by rational necessity.

Satisfiability captures the notion of being sometimes true—possibly true.

Both notions can be depicted as follows.



Lecture notes 4.0, COMP 2411, session 1, 2004 – p. 4

Models

Definition: An interpretation in which a formula φ is true is called a **model** of φ .

Hence a formula has a model iff it is satisfiable.

For example, any interpretation that assigns true to p is a model of $p \vee \neg q \wedge r$, whereas any interpretation that assigns false to p and true to q is **not** a model of $p \vee \neg q \wedge r$.

Definition: A model of a set X of formulas is a model of all members of X .

For example, any interpretation that assigns true to p , true to q and false to r is a model of $\{p, p \rightarrow q, \neg p \vee \neg r\}$, whereas any interpretation that assigns true to p and true to r is **not** a model of $\{p, p \rightarrow q, \neg p \vee \neg r\}$.

Lecture notes 4.0, COMP 2411, session 1, 2004 – p. 5

Logical consequence (2)

Logical consequence and validity are closely related:

Property: For all $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and formulas $\psi_1, \dots, \psi_n, \varphi$, φ is a logical consequence of $\{\psi_1, \dots, \psi_n\}$ iff $\psi_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \psi_n \rightarrow \varphi$ is valid.

Note the particular case where $n = 0$: it yields that φ is a logical consequence of the empty set—also written $\models \varphi$ rather than $\emptyset \models \varphi$ —iff φ is valid.

The notion of logical consequence might look more general than the notion of validity, due to infinite sets of premises: indeed, we cannot write $\{\psi_1, \psi_2, \psi_3, \dots\} \models \varphi$ iff $(\psi_1 \wedge \psi_2 \wedge \dots) \rightarrow \varphi$ is valid because infinite conjunctions are not allowed.

Lecture notes 4.0, COMP 2411, session 1, 2004 – p. 7

Logical consequence (1)

Rational reasoning is captured by the following notion.

Definition: A formula φ is a **logical consequence** of a set X of formulas iff every model of X is a model of φ .

If φ is a logical consequence of X then we write $X \models \varphi$; otherwise we write $X \not\models \varphi$.

For example: $\{p, \neg q\} \models \{(p \vee r) \wedge (\neg q \vee \neg r)\}$

Intuitively, if φ is a logical consequence of X , then φ is logically, necessarily true, under the assumption that all members of X are true.

We write $\psi \models \varphi$ rather than $\{\psi\} \models \varphi$; for instance, we write $p \wedge q \models p$ rather than $\{p \wedge q\} \models p$.

Lecture notes 4.0, COMP 2411, session 1, 2004 – p. 6

Compactness

The **compactness theorem** shows that actually, logical consequence can always be reduced to validity:

Proposition: For all (possible infinite) sets X of formulas and for all formulas φ , $X \models \varphi$ iff $D \models \varphi$ for some finite subset D of X .

For instance, $\{p_1 \rightarrow p_2, p_2 \rightarrow p_3, \dots\} \models p_2 \rightarrow p_6$, but also

$$\{p_2 \rightarrow p_3, p_3 \rightarrow p_4, p_4 \rightarrow p_5, p_5 \rightarrow p_6\} \models p_2 \rightarrow p_6$$

Hence:

Corollary: For all (possible infinite) sets X of formulas and for all formulas φ , $X \models \varphi$ iff $\psi_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \psi_n \rightarrow \varphi$ is valid for some finite subset $\{\psi_1, \dots, \psi_n\}$ of X .

Lecture notes 4.0, COMP 2411, session 1, 2004 – p. 8

Theories

Definition: A theory is a set of formulas that is closed under logical consequence.

Hence every theory is infinite.

Definition: A theory is **consistent** iff it has at least one model; otherwise the theory is **inconsistent**.

Property: Given a theory T , the following conditions are equivalent:

- T is inconsistent;
- there exists a formula φ such that both φ and $\neg\varphi$ belong to T ;
- for all formulas φ , φ belongs to T .

In other words, contradictions are not local, but spread over the whole theory.